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Common wisdom dictates that fiscal governance (i.e. procedural fiscal rules) improves 
fiscal discipline. We rather find that selected fiscal constraints protect the coalitional status 
quo from logrolling. In effect, fiscal governance may deteriorate fiscal position. 
In political economy with heterogeneous agents, we examine four procedural fiscal 
rules: limits on amendments in legislative committees, timing of a vote on the budget size, 
deficit targets, and spending level targets. We find that fiscal governance protects the 
budgetary contract of governing coalition from attractive compromises with the opposition. 
When parties are evenly distributed across single policy dimension, and minimum winning 
connected coalitions are equiprobable, this protection is shown to magnify volatility in taxes 
and spending. Moreover, the volatility may increase in more fragmented party systems. We 
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A large part of political economics examines ﬁscal outcomes in democratic po-
litical markets, with emphasis on deﬁcit and spending biases (see Imbeau [9]
for an up-to-date survey). The biases naturally motivate macroeconomists
and public economists to design ﬁscal rules so as to eliminate accompanying
ineﬃciencies. Among rules under consideration, there is a subset of pro-
cedural ﬁscal rules (a.k.a. ﬁscal governance), which are often advocated by
practitioners as relatively uncontroversial. Contrary to, say, balance-budget
requirement, procedural changes need not to overcome ex-ante political con-
straints, unless they involve redistribution of power on massive scale.
Fiscal governance comprises a very rich set of rules, ranging from power
of Finance Minister to the presence of independent statistical forecasts in
budgeting. The aboundness might be a weakness, however. Firstly, global
ﬁscal governance indices suﬀer from measurement problems with a pending
problem of weighting each criterion. Secondly, although the ﬁrst-generation
research by von Hagen [13] demonstrated signiﬁcant impact of ﬁscal proce-
dures on deﬁcit and public debt, later studies conclude only “...that budget
institutions aﬀect ﬁscal policy outcomes, but the eﬀect is quite small.” (de
Haan et al. [3], p. 284)
Even more than empirics, the theoretical part of ﬁscal governance ap-
proach has been waiting for precision. Typically, it refers to common-pool
resource (CPR) problem, which arises when policy-makers consider full ben-
eﬁts of their spending on their constituencies but only part of the tax bur-
den. Followers of the CPR argument, such as Hallerberg [7], argue that
any coordination, remeding this competitive negative externality game, cost-
lessly improves on eﬃciency. More advanced modelling of budgeting by
Dharmaphala [4] and Primo [11] nonetheless feature a virtual plethora of
results; CPR is but one feature present in budgeting.
More to that, two basic modes of ﬁscal governance have been identiﬁed
by Hallerberg and von Hagen [8]. In states where one-party government is
the norm, centralization can be achieved by delegating strong agenda-setting
powers to the ﬁnance minister (Delegation). Highly fragmented governing
coalitions in contrary require commitmments to ﬁscal targets negotiated
among the coalition partners (Commitment). Fragmentation thus conditions
eﬀects of various procedural rules on budgetary outcomes.
In this paper, we attempt to shed new light on ﬁscal governance, comple-
menting the traditional CPR approach. We analyze cases when budgeting
does not feature tragedy of commons, but political contest of parties with
diﬀerent priorities on total budgets. The paper has a twofold aim—develop a
framework for spatial modelling of procedural ﬁscal rules, and demonstrate
1their potentially adverse eﬀects.
We distinguish between two cases. In Basic Case, we provide with a full
microeconomic foundation of political demand at the disadvantage of hav-
ing only eight simple institutional conﬁgurations (Section 2). On the other
hand, for Basic Case we are able to derive explicit results on how ﬁscal gov-
ernance aﬀects coalitional contract stability. Classic Case, based on classic
speciﬁcations in spatial modelling (Euclidean preferences), is introduced in
an ensuing section. Here, a richer institutional setting with ﬁfteen conﬁgu-
rations is achieved at the expense of implicit microeconomic foundings. We
derive results of Classic Case in the general form and illustrate them in a
particular setting. Section 4, embedded in Basic Case, ﬁnally explores how





Assume a population of citizens C in an economy without production. (We
need taxes to have zero distortionary eﬀect, so it is suﬃcient to assume no
production.) The population lives in two periods t ∈ {1,2}. In the beginning
of each period t, each individual c ∈ C is endowed with income yc,t. We
shall denote the average income ˆ yt := E(yt). In each period, incomes are
taxed by ﬂat tax τt ∈ T := (0,1) and the citizens use the after-tax proﬁt
only for private consumption in that period. Tax revenues of both periods
cover production of public good in both periods gt ∈ G := h0,2i, satisfying








In other words, neither private saving nor lending is permitted; only govern-
ment has access to ﬁnancial markets.
The citizens have Cobb-Douglas utility function with private and public
good consumption in the argument and individually propensity to consume
private good αc ∈ (0,1):




The lifetime utility is a present value of discounted utilities over two
periods, with individual discount rate δc. Individuals are of diﬀerent age,
2which reﬂects an additional variable pc, deﬁned as the probability of surviving
the second period.1 Lifetime utility is accordingly:
Uc = uc,1 + pcδcuc,2
In this framework, BBR in Equation (1) allows to have public deﬁcit in
the ﬁrst period as long as it is ultimately balanced.
Deﬁnition 1 (Relative deﬁcit and spending) Deﬁne b ∈ B := h−1,1i
as the deﬁcit relative to revenues, i.e. the proportion of second-period tax
revenues used for the ﬁrst-period public consumption:
b :=
g1 − τ1ˆ y1
τ2ˆ y2/(1 + r)
Spending relative to national income is to be deﬁned as γ := g1/ˆ y1.
With this notation of budget deﬁcit, we can express public good con-
sumption in both periods:
g1 = τ1ˆ y1 + bτ2
ˆ y2
1 + r
g2 = (1 − b)τ2ˆ y2 (3)
In order to manage the analysis, let us impose reasonable simpliﬁcations.
Deﬁnition 2 (Simpliﬁcations) Hereafter, assume constant tax rate in both
periods, homogenous discount rate in the population equal to banker’s discount
rate, and endowments in both periods constant in real terms:
δ := δc =
1
1 + r
yc,2 = (1 + r)yc,1 τ := τ1 = τ2 (4)







1−αc + pc(1 − b)
1−αc
(5)
1Since individuals exit probabilistically (which can be interpreted as gradual exit),
there is a legitimate question what happens to private assets left for private consumption
but unconsumed. We assume they entirely disappear from the economy. (For instance,
all bequests fall into an external pool such as foreign-aid charity). Otherwise we would
have to specify how bequests are distributed, which arguably aﬀects equilibrium tax and
deﬁcit levels. We put this eﬀect aside for an extended version of the paper, although we
expect that the deﬁcit levels would only slightly increase in the anticipation of additional
revenues.
3By Deﬁnitions 1 and 2, b = (g1 − τˆ y)/τˆ y = (γ − τ)/τ and γ = (1 + b)τ.
This helps us to understand that total tax revenues at present value 2τˆ y are





(1 + b)τˆ y(1 + r)


















With utility function expressed in Equations (5) and (6), it is easy to de-
rive individually optimal tax and deﬁcit levels. These are, in other words,
individually-speciﬁc bliss points.
Proposition 1 (Bliss points in Basic Case) The optimal tax, deﬁcit, and
spending levels for each individual c ∈ C for unconstrained τ ∈ T, b ∈ B and
γ ∈ G are given as:
τ
∗
c = 1 − αc b
∗
c =
1 − αc √
pc






1 + αc √
pc
(7)
Notice individuals diﬀer in endowment yc, preference for private con-
sumption αc, and survival rate pc. However, Cobb-Douglas utility function
allows to disregard income eﬀect on relative demand for private vs. public
consumption. Proposition 1 indeed shows that changes in endowment don’t
aﬀect global political demand of individuals, so individuals can be classiﬁed
by merely two variables, the relative preference for private goods αc and the
probability of survival pc.
2.2.1 Parties
Suppose a set of parties N, where each party i ∈ N is a set of successful
policy-seeking citizen-candidates who are committed to a common policy
platform. The platform is to be given and stable during the budget process,
which allows us to avoid issues of party formation and (re)election. Moreover,
the policy platform is deﬁned as a utility function expressed in Equation (6),
with bliss points described in Proposition 1 below. (This notion can be
motivated, for example, by reference to a median citizen-candidate in each
party.)
4To reﬂect heterogenous voting power and specify coalition formation, we
introduce si as the number of citizen-candidates (i.e. seats in the legislature)
of party i, where si ∈ N,si > 0. Thus, each party can be described by αi, pi
and si.
Any non-empty subset of parties S ⊆ N we shall call a coalition. By
R(N), denote the set of all subsets of N, i.e. the set of all S. Given allocation
of seats s and required majority (quota) q (where
P
i∈N si/2 < q ≤
P
i∈N si),
we say a coalition S is a winning coalition, if it gathers support of at least q
votes, i.e.
P
j∈S sj ≥ q. Note that winning coalitions not necessarily need to
be minimum-winning, nor connected.2
2.3 Constrained political optima
In order to solve budgetary games as deﬁned below, we have to ﬁnd optima
of political parties under several constraints. First of all, we seek political




i (¯ τ) := γ
∗
i (αi,pi,τ)|τ=¯ τ b
∗





i (¯ γ) := τ
∗
i (αi,pi,γ)|γ=¯ γ τ
∗




i (¯ τ), b∗
i(¯ τ) and τ∗
i (¯ b), we have algebraic solutions in explicit form,
whereas for τ∗
i (¯ γ) we arrived at one in implicit form.
Proposition 2 For any ﬁxed level of ¯ τ ∈ T, the optimal spending and deﬁcit
levels in Basic Case are:
γ
∗
i (¯ τ) =
2¯ τ




i(¯ τ) = b
∗
i(τ) =
1 − αi √
pi
1 + αi √
pi
For any ﬁxed ¯ γ ∈ G, the optimal tax in Basic Case satisﬁes:
τ
∗











For any ﬁxed ¯ b ∈ B, the optimal tax in Basic Case is constant:
τ
∗
i (¯ b) = 1 − αi
2To capture connectedness in brief, deﬁne a minimum convex set including all bliss
points of coalition members. If that set includes no bliss point of any other party, we call
the coalition connected.
52.4 Fiscal governance
Before the budget process is entirely speciﬁed, we need to describe budgetary
rules. We draw on rules examined in a ﬁscal governance index by De Haan,
Moessen and Volkerink [3] who re-constructed a seminal index by von Ha-
gen [13]. Of the index, we concentrate on two items, namely the position of
legislature and the presence of explicit ﬁscal targets. This is captured by two
survey questions posed by De Haan et al. [3]:
5. Could you please indicate which one of the following is the
best characterization of the position of the parliament:
a. Possibility to propose amendments: unlimited/limited
b. Are these amendments required to be oﬀsetting: yes/no
c. Can accepted amendments cause fall of the government: yes/no
d. Are all expenditures passed in one vote: yes/chapter by chap-
ter
e. Is there a global vote on total budget size: ﬁnal/initial
6. Could you please indicate whether the government is bound
by some general constraint?
 None
 Public-debt-to-GDP ratio
 Public-debt-to-GDP ratio and deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio
 Government-spending-to-GDP ratio or Golden Rule
 Government-spending-to-GDP ratio and deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio
Clearly, the questions investigate on four procedural rules: Vote on budget
size (initial/ﬁnal), Spending level target (present/absent), Deﬁcit level target
(present/ absent), and Amendments (any/oﬀsetting/none). These become
the rules subject to our concern.
2.5 Budget process
First, let Nature select a winning coalition S ∈ G. The coalition members
bargain over the budget irrespective of development in the legislature, so we
may suppose an unconstrained Nash-bargaining solution (in Section 2.7.1,
the coalition members begin to consider development in later stages when




Uj(τS,γS) τS ∈ T γS ∈ G,γS ≤ 2τS (8)
The budget process consists of the following steps (nodes):
61. Fiscal targets. The coalition S may agree on two aggregate level limits
which are enforceable—Spending level (γ = γS) and/or Deﬁcit level
(b = bS, i.e. γ/τ = γS/τS) targets.
Then, the budget goes to the legislature.
2. Initial vote. There may be an initial simple-majority vote on the budget
size γ (unless the spending level is already targeted).
3. Amendments. This procedure is left for Classic Case. In Basic Case,
we consider only single public good γ without any internal structure
and possibility of amendments.
4. Revenue side. The Parliament votes on tax revenues τ by simple ma-
jority unless both the deﬁcit level and spending level have been set (in
that case, tax is set as a residual variable).
5. Final vote on the budget size. This node doesn’t realize if the vote has
already taken place (see Node 2), or if the spending has been deter-
mined residually by deﬁcit target and tax revenues (in Nodes 1 and
4).
We assume status quo (provisory budget, or caretaker government) is
prohibitively costly for all participants, so a fully speciﬁed budget is always
accepted in the last node.
In Basic Case, we combine three binary variables (Vote, Deﬁcit target,
Spending target), which results in eight decision-making conﬁgurations. Ta-
ble 1 describes the order of variables to be agreed in each case. In brackets,
residual variables are described.
Table 1: Decision-making nodes in Basic Case
Vote/Target None Deﬁcit Spending Both
Initial γ; τ(b) bS; γ(τ) γS; τ(b) γS,bS(τS)
Final τ; γ(b) bS; τ(γ) γS; τ(b) γS,bS(τS)
2.6 Basic Case equilibria
Since we’ve got 8 ﬁnite extensive games, we apply backward induction and
identify subgame-perfect equilibria. To solve each subcase, a concept of me-
dian party is crucial. We obtain that by analogy to the Median Voter The-
orem by Black [2]. The theorem states that a median individual is always
decisive in electoral stage if policy is located in single dimension and pref-
erences are single-peaked. Although we have a two-dimensional space here
7and parties of diﬀerent size, we can get a median party provided that de-
cisions on either of τ and γ are made separately. This is, indeed, our case.
The separation implies that a decision on one dimension is made after the
other dimension is ﬁxed. When ﬁxing any ﬁrst dimension, parties of course
anticipate the subsequent decision constrained by the ﬁxed dimension.
We need to analyze how median parties arise in single dimensions. First
of all, recall simple majority of votes is required in all nodes of the budget
process, so we use the quota qSMV := |
P
i∈N si|+1. Consider ﬁrst the subcase
of the Initial vote/No target, when γ is set in the ﬁrst step, τ in the second
step, and the deﬁcit level b is obtained residually (see also in Table 1). For
γ ﬁxed in the ﬁrst step for some ¯ γ, we get constrained optima in the second
step τ∗
i (¯ γ) for each i ∈ N. We sort parties by the optimal tax constrained by
ﬁxed spending and look for a median player. Intuitively, median player has
the property that no connected winning subset of parties can do without him
or her. For simple majority voting (as in our budget process) such a player
can be unique, or there can be two such players. If the player is unique, the
legislature coordinates on his/her preferred tax. For two players we assume,
without loss of generality, that the lower tax of the two is selected.
Deﬁnition 3 (Medians constrained on ﬁxed levels) Let the median tax
constrained on ﬁxed spending τG







SMV ∧ ∃i ∈ N : τ
∗
i (¯ γ) = τ
G








The median tax constrained on ﬁxed deﬁcit τB
M : B → T be a function of







SMV ∧ ∃i ∈ N : τ
∗
i (¯ b) = τ
B








The median spending constrained on ﬁxed tax γT
M : T → G be a function







SMV ∧ ∃i ∈ N : γ
∗
i (¯ τ) = γ
T








Let us proceed with the example of Initial vote/No target. The im-
portance of median function constrained on ﬁxed level in the second step is
anticipated as early as in the ﬁrst step; in other words, players recognize that
8the outcome in the second step cannot be conditioned by anything preced-
ing, for such a promise/threat could not be enforced. (Note that the process
ends after the second step, so nothing else but median tax constrained on
spending can be credibly promised in the ﬁrst step to those who decide on
expenditures.) So, what is the equilibrium γ chosen in the ﬁrst step? Since
parties anticipate the second stage, they optimize on the set restricted as
follows: τ = τG
M(¯ γ),τ ∈ T,γ ∈ G,γ ≤ 2τ. On that set, each party i has an
optimum denoted as [τG
M(γT∗
i ),γT∗
i ]. So, it would be the ﬁrst-best for each
party to ensure that γT∗
i gets elected in the ﬁrst step, because a tax the leg-
islature selects on the basis of this spending is the best given the restrictions.
However, since γT∗
i are located in a single dimension, it must be again the
median player who will be decisive.
This case illuminates how agents in early stages use constraints in order to
optimize in next stages. Notice that the median spending is constrained; not
on what has happened, but on what is anticipated to happen. By the same
token, we derive solutions also for other institutional conﬁgurations. For
this, we ﬁnd parties’ optima on the set restricted as follows: γ = γT
M(¯ τ),τ ∈
T,γ ∈ G,γ ≤ 2τ. We write them as [τG∗
i ,γT
M(τG∗
i )]. Notation reﬂects the
order of votes (GT for γ;τ and TG for τ;γ).
Deﬁnition 4 (Medians constrained by anticipated responses) Deﬁne
γGT
M as the median spending constrained on anticipated τG
M (i.e. median tax




















M be the median tax constrained on anticipated γT
M (i.e. median




















Note that a single median voter need not exist in an entire deﬁnition set
when a median constrained on a ﬁxed variable or a median constrained by
anticipation is constructed. Simply, players in the early stages not only
constrain sets for later stages, but also, at the same time, decide on who will
be the next decisive player, which Figure 1 illustrates. On the ﬁgure, we have
three functions of optimal spending constrained on ﬁxed tax, each for one of
9players A, B and C. The highlighted line is the function of median spending
constrained on ﬁxed tax. On the left side, we can see that for very low levels
of τ, it is B who is decisive, while for higher values it is A or C. For the
highest values, it is again B who becomes the median player. On the right
side, we get the other case when only one player (B) is decisive regardless of
decision on τ in the preceding stage, so we may call such a median function
to be ‘one-player’. For example, the median tax constrained on spending is
to be called ‘one-player’ as long as ∃i ∈ G,∀γ ∈ h0,2i : τ∗
i (γ) = τG
M(γ).
Othwerwise, the median tax constrained on spending is a ‘many-player’
median function. By analogy, we would deﬁne one-player/many-player me-
dian tax constrained on deﬁcit as well as one-player/many-player median
spending constrained on tax. Nonetheless, the fact that median players are
diﬀerent adds nothing extra to the problem of ﬁnding the subgame-perfect


















Figure 1: Many-player median spending vs. One-player median spending
2.6.2 Solutions in the general form
By backward induction, we obtain solution for any institutional conﬁgura-
tion.
Initial vote/No target We have already described the solution in the




Final vote/No target In the second stage, we obtain γT
M(¯ τ). Deﬁnition
3 has introduced tax demands for the ﬁrst stage, constrained by anticipation
of γT
M(¯ τ), denoted as τTG




10Initial & Final vote/Deﬁcit target The deﬁcit contractually set at bS




Initial & Final vote/Spending target Suﬃce to use the median tax
constrained on ﬁxed spending in order to arrive at the solution [τG
M(γS),γS].
Initial & Final vote/Both targets Obviously, the solution is [τS,γS].
2.6.3 Solutions in the speciﬁc form
In Section 4 dealing with eﬀect of fragmentation, we employ explicit solutions
to be applied in Basic Case, thereby making use of explicit assumptions from
Section 2.1. With the exception of Initial vote/No target, we can derive them
explicitly. Before doing that, we have to identify two median parties. Denote
A = [αA,pA,sA] the party with median value of α and P = [αP,pP,sP] the






























These two median parties may be diﬀerent but also identical (i.e. we may
have a double-median party).
Proposition 3 Tax and spending in Basic Case are set as follows:





1 + αP √
pP








3. Initial & Final vote/Spending target case: [τ,γ] = [τM(γS),γS], where
τ
G







M( ¯ γS) − ¯ γS
¯ γS
αS
4. Initial & Final vote/Both targets case: [τ,γ] = [τS,γS]
112.6.4 Illustration
Outcomes put in Proposition 3 can be illustrated on four diﬀerent coalitional
contracts S1,...,S4 in space T × G. Figure 2 features the contracts as well
as bliss points of median parties, A and P. Having coalitional contracts and
median preferences, we are able to get solutions in each institutional con-
ﬁguration. For Final vote/No target subcase, we denote the solution as F
(recall by Proposition 3, F is stable irrespective of coalition); it is the situ-
ation when median parties A and P can exploit their power the most. The
solutions for Deﬁcit target subcase are D1,...,D4 and for Spending target
subcase T1,...,T4. When both targets are set, the solutions are the initial
contracts S1,...,S4.
 
   
S4  S3 
P 
A 










S1 S 2 
Figure 2: Solutions in Basic Case for 4 coalitions (S1,...,S4)
The ﬁgure illuminates several facts. In the absence of ﬁscal governance,
the median parties A and P can exploit their power and always establish F.
When partial ﬁscal governance is present, solutions diﬀer tremendously; the
initial contract can be either utterly destroyed (T2 vs. S2), or only slightly
compromised (T4 vs. S4). When ﬁscal governance is complete, coalitional
contracts are perfectly stable and we get S1,...,S4. The case D2 reﬂects the
intuition in the title of the paper: parties “commit to deﬁcit” and the spend-
ing grows dramatically comparing to zero-governance mode F. By analogy,
“committment to spendig eﬀect” occurs in case of T2, when deﬁcit is close
to deﬁcit in F, but spending signiﬁcantly grows.
122.7 Endogenous coalitional contract
In the beginning, we assumed coalitional bargaining over an unrestricted
space T × G,γ ≤ 2τ, which led to an unconstrained Nash-bargaining so-
lution. However, the coalition parties know that in some conﬁgurations,
their contract may be unsustainable. Why should they agree to a contract
whose terms cannot be maintained? We shall distinguish between three cases.
Firstly, if no part of the contract can be preserved, the contract is irrelevant
(cheap talk), and coalitional agreement is irrelevant. Quite contrary, when
parties commit to two targets, the contract is protected as the whole, so the
unconstrained Nash-bargaining solution is stable.
The only analytically interesting extension emerges when the contract
is partially unsustainable, which occurs when exactly one ﬁscal target (i.e.
deﬁcit or spending level) is subject to contract. We suggest here how to
reﬁne solutions of two cases on the grounds of the anticipation of partial
unsustainability.





















The next step in the analysis of ﬁscal governance is to introduce diﬀerent
types of expenditures, which allows to tackle the eﬀect of amendment rules.
Suppose we have two public goods (with expenditure ratio x ∈ G and w ∈ G)
and all public good expenditures γ must be allocated into x and w so that
x + w = γ.
To be able to analyze the system, we will assume Euclidean preferences in
T × G2, and thereby refrain from Cobb-Douglas utility function introduced
in (5). We follow spatial approach to political economy which typically as-
sumes Euclidean preferences, speciﬁcally in space T × G (see Balassone and
Giordano [1] as well as classic Ferejohn and Krehbiel [6]); because of that,
we call the following model a Classic Case. The big disadvantage of Classic
Case is that it is actually very diﬃcult to realize how a realistic tax system
13(e.g. one with proportional tax rate) and standard assumptions imposed on
utility functions would result in circular preferences. For extensive discussion
on spatial models encountering these limitations, see Milyo [10].
The main advantage of Euclidean preferences are algebraic properties
which we intend to exploit here. For instance, τG
M(¯ γ) and γT
M(¯ τ) are constants.
In this section, we extend the spatial literature by postulating preferences in
three-dimensional space, which we ensure through the following assumptions:
∀x = ¯ x : Ui(τ, ¯ x,w) − Ui(τ
∗
i , ¯ x,w
∗
i) = (τ − τ
∗
i )




i − ¯ x)]
2















This satisﬁes that circular preferences are achieved in subspace T ×G for
any x and in subspace G2 for any τ. Figures 3 and 4 reveal how Classic Case















Figure 3: Utility functions in Classic Case
3.1 Institutional conﬁgurations
The division of budget into two public goods is a way to study amendment
part of budgeting. If amendments are permitted, we assume that the ﬁrst


















Figure 4: Utility functions in Basic Case
by targeted spending, initial vote or oﬀsetting requirement), the second com-
mittee votes on w. Otherwise, the second committee doesn’t vote. It is also
possible that amendments are prohibited as such and no committee votes at
all.
By combining three binary variables (Spending target, Deﬁcit target, and
Final vote) and one trinomial variable (Amendment), we study 24 institu-
tional compositions instead of only 5 in Basic Case. However, in three cases
when amendments are banned, total spending can diﬀer from contracted γS,
and it is necessary to deﬁne how the budgetary structure adjusts. This un-
fortunately requires that amendment procedure must take place, so we skip
these three cases as logically inconsistent. Furthermore, in some combina-
tions we receive identical nodes, thus an identical game tree. Hence, we have
in the end only 10 diﬀerent node combinations (see Table 2).
Table 2: Decision-making nodes in Classic Case
Amendment Target
Initial vote None Deﬁcit Spending Both
Any γ;x(w);τ bS;γ(τ);x(w) γS;x(w);τ bS;γS(τS);x(w)
Oﬀsetting γ;x(w);τ bS;γ(τ);x(w) γS;x(w);τ bS;γS(τS);x(w)
None γS(xS,wS);τ bS;γS(τS,xS,wS)
15Table 2: Decision-making nodes in Classic Case
Final vote
Any x;w(γ);τ bS;x;w(γ,τ) γS;x(w);τ bS,γS(τS);x(w)
Oﬀsetting x;τ;γ(w) bS;x;τ(γ,w) γS;x(w);τ bS,γS(τS);x(w)
None γS(xS,wS);τ bS;γS(τS,xS,wS)
Our interest rests with the properties of ﬁscal governance indices, so we
construct a basic index F ∈ {0,...,5}, which is a sum of the Amendment
part (0 for any, 1 for oﬀsetting, 2 for none), Final vote part (0 for initial, 1
for ﬁnal)3, and Targets (0 for none, 1 for deﬁcit, 1 for spending, 2 for both).
Table 3 comprises values of F for each institutional case.
Table 3: Fiscal governance index (F)
Target
Vote Amendment None Deﬁcit Spending Both
Any 0 1 1 2
Initial Oﬀsetting 1 2 2 3
None 3 4
Any 1 2 2 3
Final Oﬀsetting 2 3 3 4
None 4 5
3.2 Classic Case equilibria
This section shows how to identify solutions for each mode of ﬁscal gover-
nance when the budget is structured. We derive general solutions regardless
of properties of utility function assumed in Classic Case so as to have a tool
applicable beyond the scope of this paper. Doing so, we must introduce
several new variables; notice that their notation always reﬂects the order of
nodes. For instance, when the order of node is γ;x;τ, we use superscript
GXT (for budget deﬁcit target, we shall use B, and for spending target S).
3.2.1 Solutions in the general form
Initial vote/No target/Any & Oﬀsetting amendments (GXT) Solv-
ing backwards, we ﬁrstly derive the tax. Optimal τ constrained on ﬁxed
3In the case of Vote on budget size, we follow a non-intuitive result derived theoretically
by Ferejohn and Krehbiel [6] and experimentally by Ehrhart et. al [5]: initial vote on global
budget actually weakens the coalitional contract.
16spending (as well as on ﬁxed composition of spending) shall be found as
τ∗
i |x=¯ x,w= ¯ w, with median value τGXT
M (¯ x, ¯ w). In the preceding (second) step,
politicians set spending composition. They are constrained by ﬁxed spending
from the ﬁrst step, and anticipated tax in the ﬁnal step. Individual optima
can be received by x∗
i|γ=¯ γ,τ=τGXT
M , with median value xGXT
M (¯ γ).
Finally, we derive how spending is set in the anticipation of xGXT
M (¯ γ)
and τGXT




M , and the median is γGXT








Final vote/No target/Any amendment (XGT) Obviously, τXGT
M (¯ x, ¯ w) :=
τGXT
M (¯ x, ¯ w). By analogy to the previous case, we derive γXGT
M (¯ x) and get the
optimal value in the ﬁrst step xXGT
M .







Final vote/No target/Oﬀsetting amendment (XTG) By analogy, we
ﬁnd γXTG
M (¯ x, ¯ τ) for the third step. In the second step, we look for τXTG
M (¯ x),
which allows to specify median value xXTG
M in the initial node. The solution
is [τ;γ;x] = [τXTG






Initial vote/Deﬁcit target/Any & Oﬀsetting amendments (BGX)
Two variables are under control of the legislature. In the last step, parties
select xBGX
M (¯ γ,bS). The median spending in the preceding node is γBGX
M (bS),





Final vote/Deﬁcit target/Any & Oﬀsetting amendments (BXG)
In the ﬁrst step, parties choose x anticipating selection of γ in the second
step. This case is very much similar to the previous case. We denote the
median spending in the last step as γBXG
M (¯ x,bS). The median composition
adopted in the previous step is xBXG
M (bS). We get the solution as follows:





Initial & Final vote/Spending target/Any & Oﬀsetting amend-
ments (SXT) Like in the ﬁrst two conﬁgurations, we seek for tax con-
strained by ﬁxed spending and composition, thus τSXT
M (¯ x, ¯ w) := τGXT
M (¯ x, ¯ w).
To ﬁnd median decision on composition of spending, we simply insert γS and
have xSXT
M := xGXT




Initial & Final vote/Spending target/No amendment (ST) Obvi-
ously, the solution is [τ;γ;x] = [τST
M (γS;xS);γS,xS].
17Initial & Final vote/Both targets/Any & Oﬀsetting amendments
(BSX) The only variable set in the legislature is composition of spending,
reﬂecting pre-determined γS and τS. We deﬁne median value simply as xBSX
M
and achieve solution [τ;γ;x] = [τS;γS;xBSX
M ].
Initial & Final vote/Both targets/No amendments (BS) The agree-
ment of the coalition is preserved in total, and we receive [τ;γ;x] = [τS;γS;xS].
3.2.2 Illustration
Euclidean preference allow to provide the general solution in a very simple
manner. This is to be illustrated on a special case. Suppose three parties (A,
B, and C) are located in space T ×G2 and Nature selects A+B as the winning
coalition. Since majority of median functions constrained on ﬁxed variables
and median functions constrained by anticipation are constant, we derive
solutions very easily. These are depicted in Figures 5–8 and summarized in
Tables 4 and 5 as well as in Figure 9.
Table 4: Tax & Spending allocations
Target
Vote Amendment No target Deﬁcit Spending Both
Any D E F AB
Initial Oﬀsetting D E F AB
None F AB
Any D E F AB
Final Oﬀsetting D E F AB
None F AB
Table 5: Budget structure
Target
Vote Amendment No target Deﬁcit Spending Both
Any D’ E’ F’ F’
Initial Oﬀsetting D’ E’ F’ F’
None AB’ AB’
Any D’ E’ F’ F’


















































































































20Interestingly, the index of ﬁscal governance again relates to ﬁnal out-
comes. The higher index, the closer is the outcome to the coalitional contract
AB (AB’). Table 6 demonstrates this with frequencies and expected values
of ﬁscal governance for each outcome. In other words, we observe that ﬁscal
governance protects the coalitional contract like it did in Basic Case.
Table 6: Frequencies
F D E F AB D’ E’ F’ AB’
0 1 1
1 2 1 1 2 1 1
2 1 2 2 1 1 2 3
3 1 2 2 1 3 1
4 1 2 1 2
5 1 1
E(F) 1 2 21
2 31
2 1 2 21
2 4
4 Fragmentation
The eﬀects of fragmentation on ﬁscal outcome have long been subject to
intensive research, verifying mainly variants of CPR hypothesis (see Ric-
cuitti [12] for perhaps the most recent contribution to the study of ﬁscal
outcomes and fragmentation).
By CPR hypothesis, the more fragmented is the party system (measured
by Herﬁndahl index), the stronger are incentives to exploit common pool,
and worse ﬁscal outcomes. Moreover, highly fragmented systems suﬀer from
a pronounced problem of collective action during the budget coordination,
which makes the Finance Minister less reliable as a ‘non-partial’ budgetary
coordinator. Hence, Hallerberg [8] recommends Commitment mode, includ-
ing e.g. deﬁcit and/or spending targets. To sum up, ﬁscal targets are quoted
as the remedy exactly to the situations of fragmented party systems where
ﬁscal costs are expected to abound.
In this section, we observe diﬀerent results. In Proposition 3, we already
found that ﬁscal targets increase ﬁscal volatility. From macroeconomic point
of view, volatility is always costlier than stability, so despite reducing CPR
incentives, ﬁscal targets keep extreme ﬁscal positions unchallenged, thereby
amplify costs of ﬁscal volatility. Quite contrary, in the absence of targets,
the budget rests in the position of median political agent regardless of frag-
mentation and coalition composition.
We deal with two speciﬁcations. In the ﬁrst one, the higher number of
parties, the lower standard deviation of coalitional position from the globally
21median position. As a result, costs of ﬁscal volatility increase in ﬁscal gover-
nance but paradoxically decrease in fragmentation; both ﬁndings are in stark
contrast to CPR hypothesis. In the second speciﬁcation, the higher fragmen-
tation, the bigger deviation of coalitional position from the global median.
Here, ﬁscal volatility increases both in ﬁscal governance and fragmentation.
4.1 Fragmentation in αi (Basic Case)
4.1.1 Assumptions
Assume each party (citizen-candidate) i ∈ {1,...,n} has preferences [αi,pi] =
[αi,Kαi], where K is constant and a ∈ h0,1i. The citizen-candidates are
drawn from the population such as to cover the dimension α in ﬁxed dis-
tances, i.e. αi+1 −αi = αi −αi−1. This corresponds, among others, to a case
of equal distribution of α∗
i over space h0,1i and equal electoral support to all
parties.
Assume also that only minimum-winning connected coalitions (MWC)
can be formed. This might be justiﬁed by a small amount of rent distributed
in an equal proportion to coalition members. The rent introduces an incentive
to create small, namely minimum-winning coalitions. Furthermore, since the
payment scheme is ﬁxed, median members have reason to include parties
which are connected in an existing coalition (here we can easily claim that a
party x is connected to a coalition S if mini∈S(τ∗
i ) ≤ τ∗
x ≤ maxi∈S(τ∗
i )).
We can represent preference of parties in a single dimension, because for















For n parties, we need to divide the set h0,1i into n equal parts to satisfy
the assumption of ﬁxed distances. Doing so, we get preferences of party i as
αi = (2i − 1)/2n.
4.1.2 Coalitions
Consider simple-majority voting (q = sup(1/2)). Since party preferences can
be expressed in single dimension α, we deﬁne coalitions by reference to this
dimension. Deﬁne further the coalition size of S as maxi∈S(αi)−mini∈S(αi).
Odd number of parties Any MWC has to include (n + 1)/2 parties
to win a simple-majority vote. Therefore, coalition size is (n − 1)/2n and
22we have (n + 1)/2 MWCs. A median position within the coalition j ∈
{1,...,(n + 1)/2} we write as αM
j = (4j + n − 3)/4n.
Even number of parties Any MWC has to include (n + 2)/2 parties to
win a simple-majority vote. Therefore, coalition size is 1/2 and we have
n/2 MWCs. A median position within the coalition j ∈ {1,...,n/2} is
αM
j = (4j + n − 2)/4n.
Proposition 4 When party system includes odd number of parties, an un-
constrained coalitional contract of coalition j ∈ {1,...,(n + 1)/2} is as fol-
lows:
τj = 1 − α
M
j =
3n + 3 − 4j
4n
γj =
3n + 3 − 4j
2n(1 + K)
When the party system is even-sized, a coalition j ∈ {1,...,n/2} selects:
τj = 1 − α
M
j =
3n + 2 − 4j
4n
γj =
3n + 2 − 4j
2n(1 + K)
4.1.3 Comparative statics
First of all, we check that an increase in number of parties doesn’t aﬀect
the average position of the coalition, i.e. there is no bias involved with the
fragmentation.
Proposition 5 For party system of any size N, the expected coalitional con-
tract is E(τ) = 1/2.
Fragmentation brings a change to tax volatility, that we can measure by
standard deviation of tax set in a coalitional contract.
Proposition 6 For odd number of parties and n > 3, tax volatility decreases
in n. For even number of parties and n > 2, tax volatility grows in n.
4.2 Interpretation
In traditional literature, ﬁscal targets serve to lower CPR incentives, and
the need for targets becomes pronounced with higher fragmentation. Here
we have a trade-oﬀ between CPR and volatility eﬀect of ﬁscal governance
for each level of fragmentation. In standard case (like in even-sized system
we have introduced), higher fragmentation means higher volatility. Since
higher fragmentation implies also the more pronounced CPR problem, we
23cannot generally determine whether the optimal ﬁscal governance is stronger
or weaker. In an alternative case (like the odd-sized system), volatility is
smaller for highly fragmented system. Thus, the optimal ﬁscal governance
is a stronger ﬁscal governance. This is in line with traditional literature on
beneﬁts of Committment mode for highly fragmented systems. However, we
must remember that we reached this result only for a very special case.
5 Conclusion
The budgets in games we have modelled do not primarily suﬀer from alloca-
tive ineﬃciencies of the common-pool type (CPR). The problem is the pure
conﬂict of interest that cannot be overcome under given ﬂat tax system and
in the absence of compensations.
Fiscal governance appears to have two eﬀects. In CPR, it works as a
coordination device; in pure conﬂicts of ﬁscal preferences, it is a protection
device. This ambiguity implies that strong ﬁscal governance both eliminates
and magniﬁes ﬁscal costs of political fragmentation. The fact that multi-
party governments ﬁnd it easier to rely on Commitment mode, as Haller-
berg [8] observes, not necessarily means motivation for eﬃciency, but for
mutual protection.
To conclude, it may not be the case that the higher ﬁscal governance, the
better ﬁscal policy.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 Part (i): Denote Qτ := yαc
c ˆ y1−αc[(1 + δb)1−αc +
pcδ(1 − b)1−αc]. The F.O.C. requires that in equilibrium:
∂Uc(αc,pc)
∂τc
= Qτ[(1 − αc)(1 − τc)
αcτ
−αc
c − αc(1 − τc)
αc−1τ
1−αc
c ] = 0
By eliminating strictly positive Qτ, we get αc/(1 − αc) = (1 − τc)/τc, which
reduces to τ∗









c − 2τc + 1) < 0
25By assumptions, the ﬁrst term is strictly negative (α < 1), while the others




−4, so for all τ ∈ R the
term is strictly positive).
Part (ii): Denote Qb := (1 − τc)αcτ1−αc
c yαc




= Qbδ(1 − αc)[(1 + δbc)
−αc − pc(1 − bc)
−αc] = 0
Now, since Qb > 0, we obtain b∗
c = (1 − αc √
pc)/(1 + δ αc √
pc). As usual, we






1 + δ αc √
pc
(δ + αc √
pc) < 0
The ﬁrst term is strictly negative (by assumption, αc > 0), while the others
are strictly positive (δ > 0 by assumption).









1 + αc √
pc

Proof of Proposition 2 Part (i): In order to get γ∗






1−αi(1 − ¯ τ)(1 − αi)[γ−αi − pi(2¯ τ − γ)
−αi] = 0
Since αi > 0, we have ¯ τ = τ∗ = 1 − αi < 1, so the root τ = 1 doesn’t apply.
We put the last term equal zero and receive γ∗
i (¯ τ) = 2¯ τ/(1 + αi √
pi). At last,
we check that the second-order condition holds:
∂2Ui(αi,pi, ¯ τ)
∂γ2 = −αiγ
−αi−1 − piαi(2τ − γ)
αi−1 < 0







1−αi(1 − αi)[(1 + b)
−αi − pi(1 − b)
−αi]
By assumption, the ﬁrst root α = 1 is not available, so we get the only
one from the last term. Since τ is not present in the term, we clearly have
b∗
i(τ) = b∗
i. The second condition is as follows:
∂2Ui(αi,pi, ¯ τ)
∂b2 = −αi(1 + b)
−αi−1 − piαi(1 − b)
−αi−1 < 0
26Part (ii): So far, we have not explicit solution of τ∗
i (¯ γ).
Part (iii): Like in Proof of Proposition 1, Part (i), the F.O.C. necessary
to derive τ∗
i (¯ b) is given as:
∂Ui(αi,pi,¯ b)
∂τ
= Qτ[(1 − αi)(1 − τ)
αiτ
−αi − αi(1 − τ)
αi−1τ
1−αi] = 0
The solution is then the same, namely τ∗
i (¯ b) = 1−αi. Also the second-order
condition, already veriﬁed in Proof of Proposition 1, is identical. 
Proof of Proposition 3 Part (i) (Final vote/No target): By backward
induction, we start in the ﬁnal (second) step. From Proposition 2, we can
see γ∗
i |τ=¯ τ is a linear transformation of αi √
pi. A linear trasformation of a
distribution doesn’t change the identity of the median, so we get γT
M(¯ τ) is a





1 + αP √
pP
Deﬁne QP := 2/(1 + αP √
pP) for simplicity. By entering γT
M(¯ τ) into the
utility function (6), we get Ui = (1−τ)αiτ1−αi[Q
1−αi
P +p(2−QP)1−αi], where
by Proposition 1 the solution is τ∗
i = 1 − αi. Obviously, the median τTG
M is
given by median αA, hence τTG
M = 1 − αA.
Part (ii) (Deﬁcit target): By Proposition 2, we know τi|b=¯ b = 1 − αi.
Thus, τB
M = 1 − αA. Since b = bS and b = (γ − τ)/τ = γ/τ − 1, we have
γ/τ = γS/τS. Accordingly, γB
M = γSτB
M/τS.
Part (iii) (Spending target): Since γ = γS, we look for a median of τ∗
i |γS
as expressed in Proposition 2:
τ
G







M( ¯ γS) − ¯ γS
¯ γS
αS
Part (iv) (Both targets): An unconstrained Nash-bargaining outcome
[τS,γS] is preserved here as the whole. 
Proof of Proposition 4 Part (i). First of all, we obtain a coalitional






Since b is constant, suﬃce to seek τS. We can rewrite:
Y
i∈S












1−αi + pi(1 − b)
1−αi]




n = 1 − ES(α).
Part (ii). Consider the odd number ﬁrst. In each coalition j ∈ {1,..., n+1
2 },
we have (n + 1)/2 parties. Each party i within the coalition we can repre-
sent by αi such that i ∈ {j,...,j + n−1
















(n + 1)(4j + n − 1)
8
Now we easily derive Ej(α) and see that tax preferred by median position
























4j + n − 3
4n
Part (iii). Consider the even-sized system. In each coalition j ∈ {1,..., n
2},
we have (n + 2)/2 parties. Each party i within the coalition we can repre-
sent by αi such that i ∈ {j,...,j + n













(n + 2)(4j + n)
8
Now we easily derive Ej(α) and again conﬁrm that tax preferred by me-
























4j + n − 2
4n
In both cases, we get Ej(α) = αM
j , and τj = τM
j . 
Proof of Proposition 5 Part (i). Let us express the expected value of τ
for any n:
E(τ) = 1 − E(α









Part (ii). Similarly, the expected value of τ for any n writes as E(τ) =







28Proof of Proposition 6 We shall compute variance at ﬁrst, given as
Var(τ) = E(τ − E(τ))2 = E(α − 1/2)2. In ﬁnding variance, we apply a
rule
Pa
i=0 i2 = a(a + 1/2)(a + 1)/3.
Part (i). For odd size, the variance is as follows:
Var(τ) = E


























n2 + 2n − 3
48n2
To check how volatility depends on fragmentation, we analyze the slope








3(n2 + 2n − 3
For n > 3, the term is negative which means that ﬁscal volatility decreases
in fragmentation.
Part (ii). For even size of the party system, we get:
Var(τ) = E

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